Seeing life steadily: Dorothy Emmet’s philosophy of perception and the crisis in metaphysics

Summary

Dorothy Emmet's 1945 book The Nature of Metaphysical Thinking presents an account of perception aimed at rehabilitating metaphysics against logical positivism and verificationism, particularly A. J. Ayer's views. Emmet draws extensively on A. N. Whitehead and Henri Bergson rather than Russell or Moore, straddling the analytic-continental divide. Her philosophy of perception offers a way forward for metaphysics during a mid-twentieth-century crisis in British philosophy, and her ideas anticipate later movements in the philosophy of perception.

Study at a glance

Abstract

ABSTRACT The aim of this paper is to outline Dorothy Emmet's (1904–2000) account of perception in The Nature of Metaphysical Thinking (published in 1945). Emmet's account of perception is part of a wider attempt to rehabilitate metaphysics in the face of logical positivism and verificationism (of the kind espoused most famously by A. J. Ayer). It is thus part of an attempt to stem the tide of anti-metaphysical thought that had become widespread in British philosophy by the middle of the twentieth century. Emmet does not fit neatly into the traditional story of twentieth-century British philosophy. She draws on figures like A. N. Whitehead and Henri Bergson much more extensively than figures like Russell or Moore – and thus straddles the so-called ‘analytic-continental divide.’ My aim in this paper is to put Emmet on the map of twentieth-century British thought by outlining her philosophy of perception, highlighting her proposals for a way forward for metaphysics in a time of crisis, and identifying the ways she preempts movements in contemporary philosophy of perception.