Considerations on Behavior Based on Merleau-Ponty’s Criticisms

Summary

Radical behaviorism can address Merleau-Ponty's challenge to scientific psychology by treating behavior as a phenomenon in its own right, avoiding the dichotomous stalemate between mentalism and physiologism. The paper examines various understandings of behavior in B. F. Skinner's work and behavior-analytic literature, adopting Merleau-Ponty's view that ambiguity is a constitutive characteristic of behavioral phenomena. It presents an understanding of behavior based on a relational ontology that responds to Merleau-Ponty's challenges, updating radical behaviorism's philosophical potential for dialogue with traditions seeking to overcome mentalism and physiological reductionism.

Study at a glance

Abstract

In this paper, we explore the possibility of radical behaviorism to respond to the challenges posed by Merleau-Ponty to scientific psychology. According to this philosopher, modern dichotomous thinking places every psychological project in a stalemate: it adopts either mentalism, distancing itself from science, or physiologism, distancing itself from psychology. For Merleau-Ponty, the notion of behavior could be a way to avoid this impasse as long as behavior was taken as a phenomenon in its own right. However, the first behaviorist proposals did not follow this path. But what about radical behaviorism? To answer this question, we begin with different understandings of the notion of behavior found both in B. F. Skinner’s works and in the behavior-analytic literature. Considering the diversity of positions, we adopt the Merleau-Ponty stance that sees ambiguity as a constitutive characteristic of the behavioral phenomenon. From there, we present an understanding of behavior based on a relational ontology that could respond to the challenges posed by Merleau-Ponty. This proposal updates the philosophical potential of radical behaviorism, allowing it to dialogue with other traditions that have historically attempted to overcome the alternatives of mentalism and physiological reductionism.