Radical behaviorism can address Merleau-Ponty's challenge to scientific psychology by treating behavior as a phenomenon in its own right, avoiding the dichotomous stalemate between mentalism and physiologism. The paper examines various understandings of behavior in B. F. Skinner's work and behavior-analytic literature, adopting Merleau-Ponty's view that ambiguity is a constitutive characteristic of behavioral phenomena. It presents an understanding of behavior based on a relational ontology that responds to Merleau-Ponty's challenges, updating radical behaviorism's philosophical potential for dialogue with traditions seeking to overcome mentalism and physiological reductionism.
Subjective experience arises from an experiential field, a morphogenetic space that continuously shifts states. Signification is the primary structuring force, organizing perceptual flow and modulating the interplay between presence and absence as two co-implicated topological domains. Presence anchors meaning with stability and continuity, while absence is not a void but a generative force that reorganizes meaning trajectories and fosters transformation. Three conceptual propositions illustrate how presence and absence interact to shape unique subjective experience. Clinically, the framework offers a structured lens for meaning-making dynamics in therapy, and a case example shows how integrating absence can open new possibilities for change.