Self-disorders and first-person authority

Summary

The article argues that the 'ipseity disturbance model' of self-disorders cannot explain why people's reports of disturbed mineness have first-person authority. It also contends that the phenomenological account of a 'loss of common sense', typically paired with that model, fails to account for first-person authority in reports of paradigmatic self-disorders. An alternative 'grammatical' account of first-person authority, drawn from Wittgenstein and Moran, is presented and applied to such reports, including pre-psychotic experiences. Recent revisions of the ipseity disturbance model in terms of hyperreflexivity are evaluated. The authors argue that a change in the grammar of intentional concepts allows understanding reports of the hyperreflexive phenomenology of self-disorders as both first-personal and authoritative.

Study at a glance

Abstract

This article explores the notion of first-person authority (FPA) in self-disorders (SD). It will be argued that the ‘ipseity disturbance model’ (IDM) of SD cannot account for the FPA of reports of disturbed mineness in SD. Moreover, it will be argued that the phenomenological account of a ‘loss of common sense’ - typically coupled with the IDM - cannot account for the FPA of reports of paradigmatic SD. An alternative ‘grammatical’ account of FPA drawn from Wittgenstein and Moran will be presented, which we will apply to reports of such SD, and extend to include associated pre-psychotic experiences. In light of our considerations, recent revisions of the IDM in terms of hyperreflexivity will be evaluated. It will be argued that a change of grammar of intentional concepts allows us to understand reports of the (hyperreflexive) phenomenology of SD as both first-personal as well as authoritative.