Philosophy, psychiatry & psychology
January 1, 2021
Zeno van Duppen, Jasper Feyaerts
15 citations
The text explores how phenomenological philosophy, particularly concepts of intersubjectivity and temporality, can inform the understanding and treatment of thought disorder in psychosis. Drawing on the work of Sass and psychoanalytic perspectives, it argues that disturbances in the experience of time and self-other relations are central to schizophrenia. The authors suggest that integrating epistemological insights from philosophy with psychiatric practice offers new avenues for psychotherapy, emphasizing the need for therapists to attend to altered subjective experiences rather than solely focusing on symptoms. This theoretical synthesis points toward more nuanced, patient-centered approaches in mental health care.
The lancet. Psychiatry
March 1, 2026
Jasper Feyaerts, Pavan S Brar, Louis Sass et al.
1 citation
Psychiatric research has long sought to identify and treat people in the early stages of psychosis, but progress has been limited. This paper argues that combining dynamical systems theory with the phenomenological self-disturbance model of schizophrenia can improve understanding and prediction of psychosis. The integration specifies causal processes involving altered self-awareness and reality-awareness, whose dynamics can be modeled to anticipate the onset and recurrence of psychotic episodes. This approach may enable earlier, personalized therapeutic interventions. Empirical testing of the model requires intensive longitudinal studies and phenomenological assessment methods. The authors also discuss theoretical and methodological challenges to implementing their proposal.
Psychopathology
August 18, 2025
Evan J Kyzar, George H Denfield, Jasper Feyaerts et al.
1 citation
Integrating methods from phenomenology can strengthen the application of dynamical systems theory (DST) in psychopathology research. Phenomenological psychopathology improves DST-based investigations by specifying core symptoms more precisely through a focus on subjective experiences and by deepening theoretical understanding of how symptoms evolve in severity over time. Using clinical high risk for psychosis as a test case, the article demonstrates the utility of combining phenomenologically informed theory and DST, examining the ipseity-disturbance model of psychosis development. The authors offer a vision for broader integration of DST and phenomenological research methods to better understand and predict psychiatric disorders and transitions in mental health states.
January 18, 2024
Jasper Feyaerts, Barnaby Nelson, Louis A. Sass
1 citation
preprint
Phenomenological research on schizophrenia often views self-disorders as disturbances of the 'minimal self,' the most basic sense of self. This paper identifies challenges for that view, including problems with the minimal self being considered essential to conscious experience and the fact that some schizophrenia patients experience an exaggerated, not diminished, sense of self. The authors then explore an alternative 'transparency-view' of consciousness, which treats self-awareness as a transparent quality of experience rather than a separate entity. They argue this view can account for loss-of-self experiences, aligns with the concept of hyper-reflexivity (excessive self-awareness), and explains instances of increased selfhood. The paper suggests this alternative may offer advantages for research and clinical approaches.
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
June 16, 2026
Rick Bellaar, Jasper Feyaerts
The article argues that the 'ipseity disturbance model' of self-disorders cannot explain why people's reports of disturbed mineness have first-person authority. It also contends that the phenomenological account of a 'loss of common sense', typically paired with that model, fails to account for first-person authority in reports of paradigmatic self-disorders. An alternative 'grammatical' account of first-person authority, drawn from Wittgenstein and Moran, is presented and applied to such reports, including pre-psychotic experiences. Recent revisions of the ipseity disturbance model in terms of hyperreflexivity are evaluated. The authors argue that a change in the grammar of intentional concepts allows understanding reports of the hyperreflexive phenomenology of self-disorders as both first-personal and authoritative.