Psychopathology
January 1, 2008
Barnaby Nelson, Louis A. Sass
24 citations
The relationship between substance use and psychosis is usually studied as a cause-and-effect question, but the subjective experiences of both are often overlooked. This paper compares the phenomenology of psychosis onset, based on Sass's four components (Unreality, Fragmentation, Mere Being, Apophany), with the experience of hallucinogenic intoxication as described by Huxley. The analysis finds significant parallels, including a breakdown of the sign-referent relationship and disconnection from the practical world. However, in psychosis this breakdown feels like alienation from self and world, while in hallucinogenic states it is experienced as mystical union and revelation. The authors suggest a shared factor—psychotic-like experience—and propose further research on other drugs like cannabis.
Early Intervention in Psychiatry
July 2, 2023
Marija Krcmar, Cassandra Wannan, Suzie Lavoie et al.
6 citations
Basic self-disturbance is a potential core vulnerability marker for schizophrenia spectrum disorders. The Self, Neuroscience and Psychosis (SNAP) study tests a neurophenomenological model of psychosis by examining clinical, neurocognitive, and neurophysiological variables in individuals at ultra-high risk (UHR) for psychosis. It includes 400 UHR individuals, 100 clinical controls without attenuated psychotic symptoms, and 50 healthy controls. Participants complete baseline assessments and electroencephalography; UHR participants are followed for 24 months with clinical assessments every 6 months. The protocol aims to develop a prediction model for persistence or worsening of UHR symptoms at 12 months and to determine how specific these disturbances are to attenuated psychotic symptoms.
January 18, 2024
Jasper Feyaerts, Barnaby Nelson, Louis A. Sass
1 citation
preprint
Phenomenological research on schizophrenia often views self-disorders as disturbances of the 'minimal self,' the most basic sense of self. This paper identifies challenges for that view, including problems with the minimal self being considered essential to conscious experience and the fact that some schizophrenia patients experience an exaggerated, not diminished, sense of self. The authors then explore an alternative 'transparency-view' of consciousness, which treats self-awareness as a transparent quality of experience rather than a separate entity. They argue this view can account for loss-of-self experiences, aligns with the concept of hyper-reflexivity (excessive self-awareness), and explains instances of increased selfhood. The paper suggests this alternative may offer advantages for research and clinical approaches.