Direct or indirect realism? Assessing conflicting folk conceptions of vision

Summary

Laypeople hold conflicting beliefs about vision, simultaneously endorsing both Direct Realist and Indirect Realist conceptions, according to three studies using the newly developed Direct/Indirect Realist Belief Inventory (DIRBI). These conflicting beliefs are not merely superficial agreement but reflect genuine beliefs anchored in implicit knowledge structures: experiential event knowledge about vision and an implicit model of endogenous attention. The findings challenge the common philosophical assumption that there is a single, coherent common-sense conception of vision that can serve as an epistemic default in debates about perception.

Study at a glance

Abstract

Abstract Longstanding philosophical debates about the nature of perception revolve around a clash between Direct Realist and Indirect Realist conceptions of vision. These deny and affirm, respectively, that vision involves awareness of mental images which represent the physical objects of sight. The assumption that ‘the’ common-sense conception of vision is Direct Realist shapes these debates. Against this key assumption, recent studies in experimental philosophy have provided first evidence that laypeople are, collectively and often individually, torn between Direct Realist and Indirect Realist conceptions, and regard both as naïve. These findings raise a general methodological issue: Does agreement with two such patently incompatible conceptions reflect genuine beliefs? This paper crucially extends first findings, examines whether agreement ratings are indicative of beliefs, and offers an explanation of how the conflicting beliefs involved could be acquired and maintained. Three studies develop and validate the new Direct/Indirect Realist Belief Inventory (DIRBI) which uses agreement ratings with verbal and pictorial stimuli to assess the prevalence of the two conflicting conceptions among laypeople. Findings confirm that laypeople hold relevant beliefs and are, collectively and individually, torn between the two conceptions. We suggest these beliefs are ultimately anchored in ubiquitous implicit knowledge structures, namely, experiential event knowledge about vision and an implicit model of endogenous attention. We conclude that there is no such thing as ‘the’ common-sense conception of vision that could enjoy the epistemic default status accorded to common sense in many philosophical debates.