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Mamoru Nagae

4 papers in the library · publishing 2026

Papers

The Structural Conditions of Consciousness V — Structural Knot Theory — An Equation for the Degree of Subjectivity: Interpreting Limit Cases (Repositioning State-Based Theories of Consciousness: IIT, GNW, HOT, Predictive Processing, RPT, and Epiphenomenalism)

Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) June 27, 2026 Mamoru Nagae

Subjective intensity—why experiences like fear or flow feel more or less vivid—is explained as a structural feature of decision processes, not a property of neural states alone. Within the Irreversible Exclusive State Commitment (IESC) framework, subjectivity arises when multiple possible futures collapse into a single realized outcome. Intensity varies with the density of such commitment events, determined by three factors: the number of action candidates, the gradient of viability constraints, and the contraction rate of the reachable future set. This yields a formula: I(t) = |A(t)| * |grad d(s)| * ( - d|Reach(t)| / dt ).

The Structural Conditions of Consciousness II — Structural Knot Theory — Causal Closure and the Formal Derivation of the Locus of Subjectivity (Repositioning State-Based Theories of Consciousness: IIT, GNW, HOT, Predictive Processing, RPT, and Epiphenomenalism)

Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) June 27, 2026 Mamoru Nagae

Consciousness is not a generated state or an added property but the minimal positional term required to complete a causally closed description of a system undergoing irreversible exclusive determination. The paper argues that in systems with autonomous world-modifying capability, multiple internally reachable trajectories are reduced to a single realized trajectory via an irreversible elimination operation. This operation lacks structural localization, leading to a formal contradiction unless a unique locus, denoted Σ(t), is assigned. This locus is structurally identical to Irreversible Exclusive State Commitment (IESC) and to subjectivity itself.

The Structural Conditions of Consciousness I — Structural Knot Theory — Proof of Absence: Inferring the Locus of the Subject (Repositioning State-Based Theories of Consciousness: IIT, GNW, HOT, Predictive Processing, RPT, and Epiphenomenalism)

Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) June 27, 2026 Mamoru Nagae

Subjectivity is not a generated property of the brain but a structurally necessary position within any system that must act irreversibly, maintain viability, and discard most information. The paper argues that in such systems, a point of irreversible convergence is forced to exist where multiple possible futures are reduced to a single realized outcome. This convergence point alone satisfies all conditions required for subjectivity: singular realization, irreversible exclusion of alternatives, and embedding within a non-branching temporal sequence. Thus, the hard problem of consciousness is reformulated from explaining how subjective experience is generated to identifying where it must be placed within a causally closed system.

The Structural Conditions of Consciousness IV — Structural Knot Theory — Limit Cases: Application and Interpretation (Repositioning State-Based Theories of Consciousness: IIT, GNW, HOT, Predictive Processing, RPT, and Epiphenomenalism)

Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) June 27, 2026 Mamoru Nagae

Subjectivity is not a fragile or exceptional phenomenon but a robust structural feature that appears wherever the necessary conditions are satisfied. This paper tests a proposed account of subjectivity—identified as Irreversible Exclusive State Commitment (IESC)—across boundary cases including the Libet experiment, deep sleep, anesthesia, dreaming, dissociative identity disorder (DID), autism spectrum conditions, and artificial systems. It does not introduce new mechanisms but examines whether the structural conditions remain sufficient in cases where subjectivity appears absent, altered, delayed, or multiply instantiated. Across these cases, the presence, absence, and variation of subjectivity can be consistently accounted for without additional assumptions beyond the structural conditions defining IESC.