Subjective experience can be objectively explained in physical terms by moving beyond cognitive functions and understanding how experience is structured. Integrated information theory provides a framework to account for both the essential properties of every experience and the specific properties that make particular experiences feel the way they do, avoiding the fallacy that only objective properties should be explained by science.
A commentary argues that recent computational functionalist theories of consciousness, while making a welcome structural turn, largely echo predictions already made by Integrated Information Theory. The authors question whether key claims—about subjective experience, local lateral connectivity in sensory areas, and the role of silent units—are coherent within the functionalist paradigm. They emphasize the need to distinguish genuine predictions from post-hoc accommodations in consciousness science.
Contemporary consciousness science is stuck in an impasse because competing theoretical frameworks—such as structuralist versus functionalist, universal versus local, and intrinsic versus extrinsic approaches—are creating philosophical deadlocks and conceptual standstills. These parallel debates have generated insights but lack a systematic framework to understand their relationships. The authors argue that these disputes reflect deeper unresolved tensions in how consciousness is conceptualized. They propose that the debates can be addressed by recognizing three fundamental meta-theoretical dimensions: explanatory medium, scope, and perspective. The interplay among these dimensions shapes evidence, language, and concepts, reframing theoretical conflicts into tractable disagreements.