Beyond accommodation: on the structural turn in computational functionalist theories of consciousness.

A commentary argues that recent computational functionalist theories of consciousness, while making a welcome structural turn, largely echo predictions already made by Integrated Information Theory. The authors question whether key claims—about subjective experience, local lateral connectivity in sensory areas, and the role of silent units—are coherent within the functionalist paradigm. They emphasize the need to distinguish genuine predictions from post-hoc accommodations in consciousness science.

Study at a glance

Abstract

This commentary engages with recent work on computational functionalist theories of consciousness through a structural lens. We address three key aspects: the role of subjective experience in theory building, the hypothesis regarding local lateral connectivity in sensory areas, and the implications of "silent units" for consciousness. We argue that while their structural turn is welcome, many of their insights were previously predicted by Integrated Information Theory. We question the coherence of these claims within the functionalist paradigm and emphasize the importance of distinguishing genuine predictions from post-hoc accommodations in consciousness science.