A simple model for quantifying philosophical vagueness is introduced. The model's implications are discussed, including conditions under which quantifying a vague concept like 'nifty' leads to pan-nifty-ism. The key insight is that frameworks for quantifying consciousness, such as Integrated Information Theory, imply forms of panpsychism because favorable structure is already implicitly encoded in the construction of the quantification metric.
A formal model of generating experimental data and inferring conscious experiences, introduced by Kleiner and Hoel, suggests that many theories of consciousness are pre-falsified if inference reports are valid. This reply expands that model to distinguish different types of variation. Using examples from neural networks, state machines, and Turing machines, it proves that substitutions do not exist for a broad class of Level-1 functionalist theories, making them immune to the substitution argument and indicating that not all leading theories are fundamentally flawed.