Neuroscience of Consciousness
August 29, 2022
Camilo Miguel Signorelli, Ignacio Cea, Robert Prentner
8 citations
Integrated information theory (IIT) aims to explain consciousness by linking its subjective structure to physical systems without reducing it to neural activity alone. This article identifies ambiguities in IIT, particularly tensions between its claim that experience is ontologically and epistemologically primary and its goal of explaining consciousness in physical, operational terms. The authors propose ways to resolve these issues and suggest alternative explanatory approaches—mathematical, processual, and autonomy-based—that may better guide future models of consciousness. The goal is to clarify points of contention for both supporters and critics of IIT.
Consciousness and cognition
October 1, 2021
Camilo Miguel Signorelli, Quanlong Wang, Bob Coecke
4 citations
A mathematical framework using the graphical calculus of process theories (symmetric monoidal categories with Frobenius algebras) provides an ontologically neutral language to model aspects of consciousness. A toy example demonstrates how this axiomatic approach recovers features of conscious experience, including the distinction between external and internal subjective perspectives, the privacy or unreadability of personal subjective experience, and phenomenal unity—a key challenge for scientific studies of consciousness. These features emerge naturally from the compositional structure of the calculus.
arXiv Preprint Archive
July 31, 2020
Camilo Miguel Signorelli, Quanlong Wang, Ilyas Khan
Consciousness is treated as fundamental and characterized by other-dependence, meaning conscious processes are defined by their relations to one another. A mathematical framework using compact closed categories is introduced, where morphisms represent conscious processes composed of generators specified by their interrelations. This compositional model may help avoid the hard problem of consciousness and address the combination problem of conscious experiences.
bioRxiv Preprint Server
June 4, 2020
Camilo Miguel Signorelli, Lynn Uhrig, Morten Kringelbach et al.
preprint
Anesthesia disrupts the brain's hierarchical organization, which may be a key mechanism behind loss of consciousness. By analyzing resting-state fMRI data from awake and anesthetized macaques, the authors found that anesthesia reduces the flexibility and richness of brain dynamics, making them more rigid and driven by brain structure. The depth of anesthesia and the specific anesthetic agent used both modulate these effects. Spatial and temporal aspects of cortical hierarchy are affected differently, involving distinct brain networks. The findings suggest that a breakdown in brain hierarchy is a new signature of unconsciousness.