Consciousness and cognition
May 1, 2021
Anna Ciaunica, Axel Constant, Hubert Preissl et al.
99 citations
Perceptual experiences are shaped by prior events, as argued by Predictive Processing and Active Inference frameworks. This paper examines how such experiences begin before birth, within the womb. A key but often neglected point is that humans develop inside another human body, a universal experience. The authors focus on the emergence of minimal selfhood in utero as a process of co-embodiment and co-homeostasis, emphasizing their interdependence. They conclude by discussing implications for debates on conscious experience, the minimal self, and social cognition.
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
June 6, 2020
Anna Ciaunica, J. C. Charlton, Harry Farmer
78 citations
Depersonalization Disorder (DPD) alters the transparency of basic embodied pre-reflective self-consciousness and impairs the ability to flexibly switch between reflective and pre-reflective facets of self-awareness. The condition involves detachment from self, body, and world (derealization), with impaired processing of bodily signals. First-hand reports describe a fracture between an observing and an observed self, similar to self-detachment in certain Buddhist meditative practices. These alterations reveal the normally tacit transparency of pre-reflective self-consciousness, like a crack in transparent glass showing an unnoticed window.
March 13, 2022
Anna Ciaunica, Adam Safron
8 citations
preprint
Humans across cultures have intentionally sought to lose or escape their ordinary self, radically changing how they perceive themselves and the world. This paper contrasts the feeling of losing familiarity with one's self and body in depersonalisation experiences with similar changes induced by psychedelics and meditation, using the Active Inference Framework. The authors suggest that controlled alteration of prior expectations can flexibly modulate self- and world models, allowing individuals to leave behind habitual perceptual rigidities and open to new ways of integrating information. In contrast, depersonalisation involves an uncontrolled, rigid disintegration of habitual self-models, leaving a person feeling stuck in their mind and potentially leading to adverse clinical outcomes.
Quarterly journal of experimental psychology (2006)
June 1, 2025
Francesca Ferroni, Edoardo Arcuri, Martina Ardizzi et al.
7 citations
Depersonalisation (DP) involves a distressing feeling of being detached from oneself and a flattened sense of time. This study examined how DP experiences affect perception of peripersonal space (the space near the body) and time. Using an audio-tactile task, no difference in peripersonal space perception was found between people with high versus low DP experiences. A mental time travel task revealed that individuals with high DP experiences performed worse overall at locating events in time relative to their present reference point, while those with low DP experiences showed significant variation in performance for past events. The findings link altered self-awareness to disrupted egocentric spatiotemporal perception.
Scientific reports
March 13, 2024
Matt P D Gwyther, Bigna Lenggenhager, Jennifer M Windt et al.
3 citations
People with stronger depersonalisation traits—feeling detached from their own body—report more frequent dreams from an outside-observer perspective and more dreams with distinct or altered bodily sensations, along with more nightmares and higher dream recall. They also show weaker body boundaries and less trust in internal bodily signals while awake. These findings suggest that dreaming does not provide a temporary escape from depersonalisation symptoms; instead, the dream state mirrors the waking disruptions in sense of self and body.
arXiv Preprint Archive
September 22, 2024
Michael Timothy Bennett, Sean Welsh, Anna Ciaunica
Taking the naturally selected, embodied organism as a starting point, the authors provide a formalism describing how biological systems self-organise to hierarchically interpret unlabelled sensory information according to valence. Such interpretations imply behavioural policies differentiated only by the qualitative aspect of information processing. Natural selection favours systems that intervene to achieve homeostatic and reproductive goals, and quality arises to link cause to affect to motivate interventions. Access consciousness at the human level requires hierarchically modelling the self, the world/others, and the self as modelled by others, which requires phenomenal consciousness. Phenomenal without access consciousness is likely common, but the reverse is implausible. The proposal lays a foundation for a formal science of consciousness.