Self-Representationalists argue that conscious mental states are conscious because they represent themselves, unlike Higher-Order Representationalists who claim awareness comes from a separate mental state. This chapter examines why Self-Representationalists depart from Higher-Order theories and outlines internal disagreements, such as whether conscious states have separable lower-order and higher-order components and whether the higher-order part is itself represented. Challenges include the risk of collapsing into Higher-Order Representationalism, difficulty naturalizing self-representing states, and failing to capture the intimate access we have to our own consciousness.
A self-representationalist (SR) theory of consciousness aims to explain both how conscious experience arises from brain processes and why consciousness misleadingly appears irreducible to the physical. This paper examines whether SR succeeds at the second task. The theory distinguishes subjective character (being conscious at all) from qualitative character (what it is like to be in a state). While SR plausibly explains why subjective character seems irreducible, it cannot explain why qualitative character also appears irreducible. The author concludes that a hybrid position combining SR with another account may be needed to fully address the apparent irreducibility of qualitative character.
Artificial intelligence has produced notable original works in art, science, and gaming, raising the question of whether such machines can be considered creative. Human creativity often involves conscious experience of the creative process, which might suggest that unconscious AI systems are not truly creative. The author argues that consciousness is not generally necessary for creativity, but proposes a more specific claim: consciousness is required for creativity in projects with aesthetic goals. Without consciousness, an AI lacks aesthetic experience and therefore cannot engage in aesthetic creative projects.
The only scientifically justifiable stance on whether an AI could have conscious experiences is agnosticism. Evidence from the study of conscious organisms does not support either biological views skeptical of artificial consciousness or functional views sympathetic to it. Both camps overestimate what the evidence tells us. Extending scientific insights about consciousness from organisms to AI faces serious obstacles, creating a dilemma: either reach a verdict on artificial consciousness but violate evidentialism, or respect evidentialism but offer no verdict. Following the evidence requires adopting agnosticism.