Neuroscience of consciousness
January 1, 2022
Axel Cleeremans, Catherine Tallon-Baudry
97 citations
Consciousness is not a mere byproduct of brain activity but has a function: subjective experience carries intrinsic value that motivates action. The authors propose the 'phenomenal worthiness' hypothesis, arguing that agents act because they experience and care about those experiences. This value-laden quality allows comparison of different experiences in a unified, subject-centered space, explaining why consciousness feels unified. If phenomenal experience has intrinsic value, then consciousness must have a function, making the hard problem of consciousness more tractable by reframing it as a problem about function.
The Behavioral and brain sciences
July 22, 2025
François Stockart, Maor Schreiber, Pietro Amerio et al.
20 citations
The scope of unconscious processing remains hotly debated, driven by diverse methods for manipulating and measuring perceptual awareness. Through dialogue among researchers with varied theoretical backgrounds, ten recommendations and nine outstanding issues are provided for designing experimental paradigms, analyzing data, and reporting results. These guidelines aim to evoke discussion about norms in studying unconscious processes and help researchers make informed decisions. While some recommendations may not align with existing approaches and will likely evolve, they are intended to foster a more convergent understanding of the extent and limits of unconscious processing.
Frontiers in Science
October 30, 2025
Axel Cleeremans, L. Mudrik, A. Seth
17 citations
Understanding the biophysical basis of consciousness remains a major challenge for 21st-century science, made more pressing by advances in artificial intelligence. This article reviews recent developments in the scientific study of consciousness and considers future directions. It highlights novel approaches that may facilitate breakthroughs, including greater attention to theory development, adversarial collaborations, a focus on the phenomenal character of conscious experiences, and new methodologies and ecological experimental designs. The authors explore what success in consciousness science may look like, emphasizing clinical, ethical, societal, and scientific implications. Progress will reshape how we see ourselves and our relationship to AI and the natural world, usher in new medical interventions, and inform discussions on nonhuman animal welfare and ethical concerns around the beginning and end of human life.
Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences
November 13, 2025
Léa Moncoucy, Krzysztof Dołęga, Catherine Tallon-Baudry et al.
5 citations
Phenomenal experience—what it feels like to be an organism—has intrinsic value that cannot be reduced to evolutionary cost-benefit calculations. While all organisms act for reasons shaped by extrinsic evolutionary pressures, some also act for reasons of their own, sometimes even in ways detrimental to their survival. This shift marks a fundamental change in nature: subjective experience broadens an organism's capacity to act not merely in response to objective evolutionary value but also according to preference-driven subjective value associated with items, situations, events, or other agents. Subjective value can serve both as a driver of behavior and as a target for behavior, making it irreducible to extrinsic forms of value.
Open mind : discoveries in cognitive science
January 1, 2024
Pietro Amerio, Matthias Michel, Stephan Goerttler et al.
5 citations
Comparing conscious and unconscious perception is central to consciousness science, but many studies fail to control for criterion biases when assessing awareness. In this study, observers tried to discriminate subjectively invisible offsets of Vernier stimuli, with visibility probed using a bias-free task. Stimuli were made less visible by backward masking or very brief presentation (1-3 milliseconds) using a modern tachistoscope. Some behavioral indicators of perception without awareness appeared, but no conclusive evidence emerged. Bayesian observer model simulations, including models generating visibility judgments alongside type-1 judgments, best fit observers with slightly suboptimal conscious access to sensory evidence. The stimuli and manipulations produced mild blindsight-like behavior, suitable for future investigation.
Neuroscience of consciousness
January 1, 2026
Alicia Franco-Martínez, Ricardo Rey-Sáez, Jesús Adrián-ventura et al.
1 citation
Working memory may operate on unconscious perceptual contents, though it remains linked to conscious perception. A large, multisite replication (19 labs, 531 participants, 720 trials) of Soto et al. (2011) found above-chance accuracy (.55) on a visual discrimination task when participants reported not seeing the subliminal Gabor grating. Performance correlated positively with cue detection sensitivity (r = .228), and the regression intercept was significantly above chance (β₀ = .521). The study provides an open-access dataset and confirms that measures were reliable and valid, supporting the existence of unconscious working memory.
Affective Science
June 30, 2026
Lena Lange, Axel Cleeremans
The role of consciousness in motivation is examined, questioning whether unconscious incentives can drive goal pursuit. A critical review of empirical and theoretical works supporting unconscious motivation contrasts them with a valence-centered account. Recent methodological advances in unconscious processing raise concerns about accurately assessing perceptual awareness in previous cognitive neuroscience experiments that proposed alternative processing routes for unconscious external reward cues. A conflation of automatic behavior responses with intentional, motivated behavior is discussed. The subjective experience of valence, a fundamental aspect of phenomenal consciousness, is argued to be the core organizing principle of human intentional behavior, supported by findings that affective evaluation is integral to perceptual experience.
Consciousness and cognition
March 1, 2025
Charlotte Van den Driessche, Clotilde Chappé, Mahiko Konishi et al.
The stream of thought can be partitioned into five distinct mental states: focus, task-related interference, external distraction, daydream, and blank. This classification, called the Classification of Mental States (CoMS-5T), was tested for validity. Participants gave free verbal reports of their mental contents, which external raters then classified, supporting the construct validity and neutrality of the system. A reanalysis of a large dataset from Beikmohamadi and Meier (2022) found distinct behavioral signatures for four of the five states, providing criterion validity. The work offers a systematic way to describe and measure the ongoing stream of thought in cognitive psychology.
Consciousness and cognition
August 1, 2019
Monika Derda, Marcin Koculak, Bert Windey et al.
Electrophysiological signatures of visual awareness can be distinguished from other task-related processes by manipulating the level of processing of visual stimuli. In an EEG experiment, 36 subjects performed either color (low-level) or magnitude (high-level) evaluations of masked digits and rated their subjective visibility. Mean amplitude in the VAN component time window (140-240 ms) correlated with visibility ratings in both conditions. Mean amplitude in the LP time window (380-480 ms) correlated with visibility ratings only in the high-level condition. These results support a temporal unfolding of ERP markers of conscious processing: an early component reflects initial perceptual experience, while a late component correlates with conscious experience of non-perceptual information.
Consciousness and cognition
October 1, 2017
Marek Binder, Krzysztof Gociewicz, Bert Windey et al.
Transitions from unconscious to conscious perception may be more gradual for low-level visual features and more dichotomous for high-level features. In an fMRI study using backward masking, participants reported a target digit's magnitude (high-level) or its color (low-level) and rated visibility. Intermediate visibility was reported more often in the low-level task, supporting the levels-of-processing hypothesis. Visible targets activated insulo-fronto-parietal regions in both tasks, while visual areas showed higher activity in the low-level task across all visibility levels. The findings suggest that attentional modulation of feature-representing brain regions mediates how processing level shapes conscious perception.