A list of eight criteria is developed to evaluate tests for animal consciousness, addressing the challenge that many proposed behavioral and cognitive tests lack clear validity. The criteria are based on analogies between human and non-human behavior, theories of consciousness, and methods from human consciousness science. Tests that satisfy more of these criteria provide stronger evidence of consciousness, and future tests can be designed to meet them to increase evidential strength.
Evolutionary arguments alone cannot confirm or falsify hypotheses about consciousness; consciousness science must rely primarily on experimental and observational evidence from humans and other animals alive today. The authors argue against "evolution-first" approaches that treat evolutionary considerations as the primary lens for assessing consciousness. Using Walter Veit's account as an example, they contend such approaches lack compelling empirical support. While evolutionary thinking can help advance consciousness research, it should not be foundational for hypothesis justification, though it may still play a role in hypothesis generation.
Sensorimotor enactivism claims that perceptual experience is shaped by implicit knowledge of how bodily movements alter sensory input. Proponents argue this view uniquely explains why specific material realizers produce particular experiences, closing the 'explanatory gap' that rival theories leave open. The author challenges this by showing the notion of 'material realizer' is ambiguous. Under a narrow interpretation, enactivism fails to bridge the gap; under a wide interpretation, it succeeds only to the same degree as established theories of consciousness. Therefore, enactivism offers no superior explanatory power over traditional accounts of conscious experience.