Brain and cognition
December 1, 2011
Valdas Noreika, Leila Jylhänkangas, Levente Móró et al.
62 citations
Subjective experiences can occur even when a person appears unresponsive under sedation. In a nonsurgical setting, participants given dexmedetomidine, propofol, sevoflurane, or xenon recalled having subjective experiences in almost 60% of sessions after regaining responsiveness. During dexmedetomidine sessions, such experiences were linked to shallower sedation depth as measured by an EEG-based monitor. The findings indicate that unresponsiveness does not guarantee absence of consciousness, and studies on phenomenal consciousness under anesthetics should assess subjective states through post-recovery interviews.
Neuroscience of consciousness
January 1, 2020
William Wong, Valdas Noreika, Levente Móró et al.
35 citations
In a test of whether brain activity alone can reveal when someone is dreaming, researchers used an unsupervised machine learning classifier to distinguish dreamful from dreamless sleep based on EEG spectral power and electrode location. Nine participants contributed 54 one-minute polysomnograms from non-rapid eye movement sleep—27 with dreams and 27 without. A blinded Analysis Team attempted to classify each recording over five iterations with gradually reduced blindness. At no stage did the classifier perform significantly better than chance, indicating that EEG spectral power features could not reliably detect signatures of phenomenal consciousness in this dataset.
Epilepsy & behavior : E&B
August 1, 2008
Mirja Johanson, Katja Valli, Antti Revonsuo et al.
19 citations
People with partial epilepsy experience widespread distortions in their subjective experience during seizures, yet the pattern of those distortions remains consistent from one seizure to the next. A standardized questionnaire called the Phenomenology of Consciousness Inventory (PCI) proved suitable for capturing these changes in consciousness. The findings suggest that the PCI could help researchers and clinicians better understand the nature of phenomenal consciousness in epilepsy.
Psychology of Consciousness Theory Research and Practice
June 12, 2025
Etzel Cardeña, Aviva Berkovich‐ohana, Katja Valli et al.
11 citations
A multidisciplinary, international group used taxonomic principles and a modified Delphi method to create a taxonomy of altered states of consciousness based on central phenomenological features. They identified eight distinct states, some with subcategories: proto and transitional, delirium, minimal to no awareness, experiential detachment, enhanced physicality, altered identity, imaginary/fantasy/visionary, and unity/mystical. The authors hope this taxonomy will foster conceptual clarity and stimulate research across specializations, helping reveal what is common and different across triggers and antecedents of altered states, and encouraging phenomenological, psychological, cultural, and neuroscientific understanding.
Nature communications
August 13, 2025
William Wong, Rubén Herzog, Kátia Cristine Andrade et al.
10 citations
A new open database, the DREAM database, combines standardized sleep magneto/electroencephalography (M/EEG) recordings with dream reports from 505 participants across 20 datasets, totaling 2,643 awakenings. Each awakening includes at least 20 seconds of high-resolution sleep EEG (≥100 Hz, ≥2 electrodes) and a classification of the sleeper's reported experience. Analyses showed that reports of conscious experiences during sleep can be predicted from objective EEG features in both REM and NREM sleep. The database aims to overcome limitations of small sample sizes and methodological variability in dream research, enabling larger-scale investigations of the neurocognitive basis of dreaming.
bioRxiv Preprint Server
May 27, 2019
William Wong, Valdas Noreika, Levente Móró et al.
preprint
A test called the Dream Catcher test was conducted for the first time in a simplified form to see if brain activity alone can reveal whether someone is dreaming. Data Team collected brain measurements (polysomnograms) during NREM sleep from 9 participants, producing 54 one-minute recordings—27 from dreamful sleep and 27 from dreamless sleep. A blinded Analysis Team tried to classify each recording as dreamful or dreamless using an unsupervised machine learning classifier based on EEG spectral power and electrode location. Over five iterations with gradually reduced blindness, the team never performed significantly better than chance. The results suggest that EEG spectral power does not carry signatures of phenomenal consciousness, and the study also failed to replicate key findings from earlier reports on dreaming consciousness.
bioRxiv Preprint Server
April 12, 2019
Valdas Noreika, Jennifer M. Windt, Markus Kern et al.
preprint
Applying transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) over the sensorimotor cortex during REM sleep reduces reported dream movement, particularly repetitive actions, without affecting other bodily sensations like touch or balance. This effect coincides with reduced interhemispheric coherence in parietal areas and altered muscle activity correlation between arms. The findings indicate that tDCS causally interferes with the neural mechanisms underlying dream movement, confirming the spatial specificity of the stimulation site and suggesting a reorganization of the motor network during dreaming.