Front Psychol
January 24, 2017
Carlos Montemayor, Harry H. Haladjian
70 citations
Perception and cognition are largely independent systems, but they still influence each other in systematic ways. Evidence from evolution and from the dissociation between consciousness and attention shows that the two processes operate with distinct principles and neural mechanisms, yet their interactions are structured rather than arbitrary. The argument draws on evolutionary considerations and empirical findings to support the view that perception and cognition are separate but interacting faculties.
Journal of Consciousness Studies
March 31, 2023
A. Newen, Carlos Montemayor
8 citations
A novel theoretical framework called the ALARM theory of consciousness distinguishes two levels: basic arousal, an alarm system for survival under sudden intense threats, and general alertness, which enables flexible learning and behavior. This two-level account explains recent discoveries of subcortical brain activities involving the thalamus, differences in non-human animal behavior suggesting two types of conscious experience, unifies neural evidence for subcortical and cortico-cortical processes, and clarifies the evolutionary and functional role of conscious experiences.
Front Syst Neurosci
November 22, 2021
Carlos Montemayor
6 citations
Consciousness research faces a cognitive-diversity problem because attention is understood as a diverse set of functions and capacities, yet consciousness is typically treated as a single, unified phenomenon. This inconsistency undermines claims that attention is necessary for consciousness or precedes conscious awareness. The article argues that consistency demands consciousness also be considered a diverse set of capacities, reflecting the multiplicity of kinds of attention. This implies diverse conscious capacities and types of awareness beyond standard distinctions like being awake, dreaming, or minimally conscious.
Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci
November 13, 2025
Albert Newen, Carlos Montemayor
2 citations
Consciousness is rarely examined from an evolutionary perspective, yet doing so can resolve conflicts among leading theories that focus too narrowly on cortical brain regions. The authors distinguish three core phenomena of phenomenal consciousness: basic arousal, which alarms the body and secures survival by intervening in slow homeostatic updates; general alertness, which fosters advanced learning and decision-making; and reflexive (self-)consciousness, which enables future-directed long-term planning and understanding others' minds. Each has a distinct function. Constraining theories of consciousness with this evolutionary and functional approach can advance the science of consciousness and guide the search for distinct neural correlates.
Frontiers in psychology
January 1, 2025
Marc Wittmann, Carlos Montemayor, Mauro Dorato
1 citation
Building on the Stoic concept of self-regulation, this paper argues that contemporary findings from psychology and cognitive neuroscience do not refute free will but instead support and refine a Stoic view of it. Contrary to classical interpretations of Libet-type experiments, which are often cited to deny free will, the authors contend that such evidence undermines the idea that humans are passive recipients of spontaneous desires. Instead, people possess the capacity to regulate actions proactively by cultivating deliberate, voluntary intentions. Freedom arises from a meta-cognitive, hierarchical second-order will that can causally override first-order desires or impulsive habits. Choices are not entirely predetermined by upbringing or circumstances; they emerge from the capacity to reflect upon and respond to those influences, making the self a self-determined free agent.
Consciousness and cognition
October 1, 2016
Harry Haroutioun Haladjian, Carlos Montemayor
Phenomenal consciousness cannot be implemented in machines, despite advances in artificial intelligence that aim to reproduce human perception, cognition, and emotions. While ethical behavior may be programmable through rules and machine learning, emotions and empathy will remain simulations, not genuine experiences. Arguments from evolution, neuropsychology of emotions, and the dissociation between attention and consciousness in humans support this claim. The authors conclude that artificial consciousness is far from achievable.
arXiv Preprint Archive
June 10, 2024
Azenet Lopez, Carlos Montemayor
The Integrated Information Theory (IIT) is a leading scientific proposal for explaining phenomenal consciousness, but it overlooks the essential role of attention in generating and shaping conscious experience. Without an account of attention, IIT cannot explain informational differences between types of experiences. Although some IIT proponents claim a double dissociation between consciousness and attention, close analysis shows this dissociation is incompatible with IIT. These issues likely extend to other internalist and primitivist theories of conscious contents in philosophy, as well as to structuralist approaches. The discussion highlights that attention is indispensable for both scientific and philosophical theorizing about conscious experience.
Psychology of Consciousness
June 12, 2023
H. Haladjian, Carlos Montemayor
Attention and consciousness process information differently, and no current theory adequately explains this distinction in informational terms. Information processed through attention is algorithmic, while conscious information processing involves neurobiological homeostatic processes. Subjectivity in consciousness can be understood through unique informational properties such as irreproducible or biologically encrypted information. These proposals could help resolve conflicting accounts of the neural correlates of consciousness and move toward a more unified theoretical framework.