Stoicism, mindfulness, and the brain: the empirical foundations of second-order desires.
Frontiers in psychology January 1, 2025 Marc Wittmann, Carlos Montemayor, Mauro Dorato 1 citation
Building on the Stoic concept of self-regulation, this paper argues that contemporary findings from psychology and cognitive neuroscience do not refute free will but instead support and refine a Stoic view of it. Contrary to classical interpretations of Libet-type experiments, which are often cited to deny free will, the authors contend that such evidence undermines the idea that humans are passive recipients of spontaneous desires. Instead, people possess the capacity to regulate actions proactively by cultivating deliberate, voluntary intentions. Freedom arises from a meta-cognitive, hierarchical second-order will that can causally override first-order desires or impulsive habits. Choices are not entirely predetermined by upbringing or circumstances; they emerge from the capacity to reflect upon and respond to those influences, making the self a self-determined free agent.