Journal of Consciousness Studies
March 31, 2023
A. Newen, Carlos Montemayor
8 citations
A novel theoretical framework called the ALARM theory of consciousness distinguishes two levels: basic arousal, an alarm system for survival under sudden intense threats, and general alertness, which enables flexible learning and behavior. This two-level account explains recent discoveries of subcortical brain activities involving the thalamus, differences in non-human animal behavior suggesting two types of conscious experience, unifies neural evidence for subcortical and cortico-cortical processes, and clarifies the evolutionary and functional role of conscious experiences.
Frontiers in psychology
January 1, 2025
Marc Wittmann, Carlos Montemayor, Mauro Dorato
1 citation
Building on the Stoic concept of self-regulation, this paper argues that contemporary findings from psychology and cognitive neuroscience do not refute free will but instead support and refine a Stoic view of it. Contrary to classical interpretations of Libet-type experiments, which are often cited to deny free will, the authors contend that such evidence undermines the idea that humans are passive recipients of spontaneous desires. Instead, people possess the capacity to regulate actions proactively by cultivating deliberate, voluntary intentions. Freedom arises from a meta-cognitive, hierarchical second-order will that can causally override first-order desires or impulsive habits. Choices are not entirely predetermined by upbringing or circumstances; they emerge from the capacity to reflect upon and respond to those influences, making the self a self-determined free agent.
Consciousness and cognition
October 1, 2016
Harry Haroutioun Haladjian, Carlos Montemayor
Phenomenal consciousness cannot be implemented in machines, despite advances in artificial intelligence that aim to reproduce human perception, cognition, and emotions. While ethical behavior may be programmable through rules and machine learning, emotions and empathy will remain simulations, not genuine experiences. Arguments from evolution, neuropsychology of emotions, and the dissociation between attention and consciousness in humans support this claim. The authors conclude that artificial consciousness is far from achievable.
arXiv Preprint Archive
June 10, 2024
Azenet Lopez, Carlos Montemayor
The Integrated Information Theory (IIT) is a leading scientific proposal for explaining phenomenal consciousness, but it overlooks the essential role of attention in generating and shaping conscious experience. Without an account of attention, IIT cannot explain informational differences between types of experiences. Although some IIT proponents claim a double dissociation between consciousness and attention, close analysis shows this dissociation is incompatible with IIT. These issues likely extend to other internalist and primitivist theories of conscious contents in philosophy, as well as to structuralist approaches. The discussion highlights that attention is indispensable for both scientific and philosophical theorizing about conscious experience.