Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences
September 19, 2018
Peter Fazekas, Morten Overgaard
30 citations
The problem of explaining how subjective experiences like colors, sounds, and tastes arise from brain processes is often considered the greatest unsolved mystery. A key question is whether the neural basis of perceptual consciousness is separate from the neural basis of cognitive access mechanisms that allow reporting and reflecting on conscious experiences. This Theme Issue critically discusses current empirical findings, identifies methodological problems, and proposes novel approaches to this central issue in consciousness research.
Frontiers in neurology
January 1, 2020
Peter Fazekas, Georgina Nemeth
14 citations
Dreaming, mind-wandering, and hypnotic dreams may share underlying neural mechanisms, challenging earlier theories. Hobson's AIM theory mapped states of consciousness along dimensions of brain activity, input source, and neurochemical modulation, linking REM dreaming to other altered states like hypnosis. However, hypnosis is not a sleep-like state, and dreaming is not REM-centric. The neuro-cognitive theory places dreaming and mind-wandering on a continuum driven by default-mode network activity, questioning AIM theory. This paper argues that hypnotic dreams—experiences arising from explicit suggestions during hypnosis—can inform the neuro-cognitive theory, and comparing them with dreaming and mind-wandering may advance understanding of consciousness.
Consciousness and cognition
September 1, 2021
Asger Kirkeby-Hinrup, Peter Fazekas
5 citations
A new inference to the best explanation (IBE) process is proposed for comparing theories of consciousness based on empirical support. The process has four steps: Assimilate, Compile, Validate, and Compare. Most work so far has focused on assimilation. To demonstrate feasibility, the authors compile a complete collection of empirical evidence for the distinction between access consciousness (A-Consciousness) and phenomenal consciousness (P-Consciousness) and the overflow hypothesis. They also validate the interpretation of aphantasics' performance on retro-cue paradigms, which has been used to support the overflow hypothesis. This compilation is the first step toward enabling side-by-side comparisons of theories and the empirical phenomena they explain.