Delusions are a varied phenomenon across psychiatric conditions, especially common in schizophrenia. A core philosophical debate, the typology problem, asks what kind of mental state underlies delusional reports—whether they are beliefs (doxastic) or something else (anti-doxastic). This paper critically reviews the scattered literature on this issue. It clarifies two main philosophical approaches (interpretivism and functionalism) and introduces new subcategories: revisionist and non-revisionist doxastic views, and commonsensical and non-commonsensical anti-doxastic views. The analysis concludes by highlighting fundamental unresolved challenges in the debate, which has implications for experimental psychiatry and psychotherapy development.
4E Cognition approaches—emphasizing embodied, embedded, extended, and enactive features—have emerged to challenge the view that mental disorders are solely brain disorders. This paper examines and classifies these approaches into two main strands: strongly situated or extended views, based on the extended mind hypothesis, and strongly embodied and enactive views, based on autopoietic enactivism. It analyzes how each strand addresses the location problem (whether disorders reside in individuals, social contexts, or their relation) and the boundary problem (distinguishing psychopathology from non-pathological diversity like social deviance). The paper also outlines practical implications of the 4E turn in mental health research.