Wiley interdisciplinary reviews. Cognitive science
January 1, 2024
Pablo López-silva, Miguel Núñez De Prado-Gordillo, Victor Fernández-castro
4 citations
Delusions are a varied phenomenon across psychiatric conditions, especially common in schizophrenia. A core philosophical debate, the typology problem, asks what kind of mental state underlies delusional reports—whether they are beliefs (doxastic) or something else (anti-doxastic). This paper critically reviews the scattered literature on this issue. It clarifies two main philosophical approaches (interpretivism and functionalism) and introduces new subcategories: revisionist and non-revisionist doxastic views, and commonsensical and non-commonsensical anti-doxastic views. The analysis concludes by highlighting fundamental unresolved challenges in the debate, which has implications for experimental psychiatry and psychotherapy development.
Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology
June 1, 2025
Miguel Núñez De Prado-Gordillo, Pablo López-silva
2 citations
4E Cognition approaches—emphasizing embodied, embedded, extended, and enactive features—have emerged to challenge the view that mental disorders are solely brain disorders. This paper examines and classifies these approaches into two main strands: strongly situated or extended views, based on the extended mind hypothesis, and strongly embodied and enactive views, based on autopoietic enactivism. It analyzes how each strand addresses the location problem (whether disorders reside in individuals, social contexts, or their relation) and the boundary problem (distinguishing psychopathology from non-pathological diversity like social deviance). The paper also outlines practical implications of the 4E turn in mental health research.
Philosophical Psychology
March 26, 2024
Pablo López-silva
2 citations
Delusions of thought insertion (TI) involve the distressing feeling that external agents have placed thoughts into one's mind, accompanied by loss of mental privacy and a sense of physical intrusion. The dominant cognitive-science explanation, the Standard Approach, attributes TI to a lack of sense of agency for one's own thoughts, leading to their externalization. This paper argues that the Standard Approach overlooks two more fundamental aspects: the multimodal nature of thinking in psychosis and the deeply social dimension of delusional experience in schizophrenia. A broader descriptive phenomenological characterization of TI is offered, and connections are drawn to current research in social perception and clinical practice.