Altered states of selfhood can be understood through three distinct components—self, me, and I—that appear in spontaneous experiences. Eight neurophenomenological case studies describe how these components can become dissociated or recombined during non-ordinary states, such as meditation, flow, or depersonalization. The reports illustrate that the sense of being a subject (I), the sense of having a personal identity (me), and the sense of agency or ownership (self) can each be altered independently. This framework helps clarify the structure of self-consciousness and its variations in everyday life and clinical conditions.
The paper argues that current terminology for disorders of consciousness—such as 'nonconscious,' 'unconscious,' and 'subconscious'—carries different conceptual meanings that influence clinical understanding and ethical treatment of patients. It proposes expanding the discussion to consider these distinctions more carefully, suggesting that labeling patients as 'nonconscious' may imply a complete absence of experience, while 'subconscious' could allow for residual awareness. The authors advocate for a more nuanced language that reflects the complexity of consciousness states, aiming to improve both scientific accuracy and compassionate care.