Frontiers in psychiatry
January 1, 2022
Christophe Gauld, Kristopher Nielsen, Manon Job et al.
13 citations
Psychiatry cannot rely solely on reductionism; it requires a plurality of approaches. Enactivism, rooted in cognitive science, dynamic systems theory, systems biology, and phenomenology, offers an integrative framework for psychiatry. This paper compares the enactive approach with two forms of explanatory pluralism: non-integrative pluralism, which tolerates coexisting incompatible systems, and integrative pluralism, which aims to unite different levels of understanding. The authors propose that enactivism is inherently a form of integrative pluralism but also part of a broader explanatory pluralism. Understanding these theoretical positions is important for quality clinical practice, and studying the entanglements between analytical pluralism and enactivist pluralism could be fruitful.
L Encéphale
November 12, 2020
Hugo Bottemanne, A. Claret, Philippe Fossati
10 citations
No Summary
Hugo Bottemanne, Orphée Morlaàs, Anne Claret et al.
4 citations
preprint
Ketamine infusion makes people with treatment-resistant depression more optimistic about the future by changing how they learn from good and bad news. After a single infusion, patients updated their beliefs more after favorable information and less after unfavorable information, compared to healthy controls. This shift toward optimism was driven by learning more from positive surprises than negative ones. This change in belief-updating predicted early clinical improvement at one week, seen in 19% of patients. The findings suggest ketamine's antidepressant effects involve altering cognitive biases, which could enhance psychotherapy for depression.
Neuroscience and biobehavioral reviews
March 1, 2026
Andrew Laurin, Hugo Bottemanne, Samuel Bulteau et al.
2 citations
A review proposes that post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) involves disrupted body awareness, specifically the sense of body ownership and sense of agency, which current models overlook. Using predictive processing theory, it distinguishes two PTSD subtypes. In non-dissociative PTSD, hyperprecise trauma-related prior beliefs and heightened interoceptive signals (due to amygdala and anterior insula hyperactivity) produce rigid self-representations, with cognitive processing ranked as prior, interoception, then exteroception. In the dissociative subtype, emotional over-inhibition and anterior insula hypoactivity weaken priors and interoception, while exteroception dominates (exteroception, interoception, prior). Sense of agency impairments are specific to the dissociative subtype, linked to angular gyrus hyperactivity and glutamate hypofunction. The framework suggests a dimensional model of body consciousness disruption across the PTSD spectrum and discusses therapeutic implications for top-down and bottom-up interventions.