Paris-Saclay Institute of Neuroscience (NeuroPSI), CNRS, Centre CEA Paris-Saclay, Gif-sur-Yvette, 91190, France. Electronic address: borjan.milinkovic@cnrs.fr.
2 papers in the library · 9 citations · publishing 2025-2026
Consciousness in biological systems arises from two fundamental computational features absent in current artificial intelligence: scale-inseparable, substrate-dependent multiscale processing as a metabolic optimization strategy, and continuous-valued computations performed by the fluidic substrate alongside discrete operations. These features are essential to the brain's mode of computation. The absence of consciousness in artificial systems reflects a deeper divide between digital and biological computation, not merely missing functional organization. The authors outline foundational principles of a biological theory of computation and explain why current AI systems are unlikely to replicate conscious processing as it arises in biology.
Consciousness depends on neural activity across many scales. A new measure, dynamical independence (DI), quantifies these multi-scale relationships. Applying DI to EEG data from people under three anaesthetics, the authors found that propofol and xenon—which abolish conscious report—produce more emergent but highly variable dynamic structure, indicating fragmented macroscopic organisation. Ketamine, which preserves dream-like states, shows reduced overall emergence but partial preservation of macroscopic structure similar to wakefulness. Regional brain contributions varied. The results reveal drug-specific reconfigurations of emergent dynamics, dissociate the amount of emergence from its organisation, and caution against equating emergence with consciousness level.