Current biology : CB
June 22, 2020
Matthieu Koroma, Célia Lacaux, Thomas Andrillon et al.
34 citations
During REM sleep, the brain flexibly amplifies or suppresses external sounds depending on eye movements. Using EEG to reconstruct speech from brain responses in a multi-talker environment, meaningful speech was amplified over meaningless speech overall. However, at the precise moments of rapid eye movements, meaningful speech was selectively suppressed. This shows that eye movements during REM sleep act as a gate, selectively blocking informative external stimuli while allowing them at other times, resolving a long-standing debate about whether the sleeping brain processes or ignores the outside world.
Trends in cognitive sciences
March 12, 2025
Thomas Andrillon, Antoine Lutz, Jennifer Windt et al.
14 citations
Moments during wakefulness that seem empty of any reportable thought, called mind blanking (MB), are not simply gaps in experience but distinct mental states with their own characteristics. This review maps MB by examining how people report it, its brain activity, and its links to related phenomena such as meditation and sleep. The authors propose that ongoing experience varies in richness, and contentless events represent a diverse category of mental states. They argue that recognizing MB as a reportable mental category is essential for a full understanding of how the mind works during wakefulness.
Nature communications
August 13, 2025
William Wong, Rubén Herzog, Kátia Cristine Andrade et al.
10 citations
A new open database, the DREAM database, combines standardized sleep magneto/electroencephalography (M/EEG) recordings with dream reports from 505 participants across 20 datasets, totaling 2,643 awakenings. Each awakening includes at least 20 seconds of high-resolution sleep EEG (≥100 Hz, ≥2 electrodes) and a classification of the sleeper's reported experience. Analyses showed that reports of conscious experiences during sleep can be predicted from objective EEG features in both REM and NREM sleep. The database aims to overcome limitations of small sample sizes and methodological variability in dream research, enabling larger-scale investigations of the neurocognitive basis of dreaming.
PNAS nexus
December 1, 2024
Emilia Fló, Laouen Belloli, Álvaro Cabana et al.
10 citations
Directing attention toward the body's internal signals (interoception) versus external sounds (exteroception) produces distinct brain activity patterns. Exteroceptive attention flattened overall brain wave power, while interoceptive attention reduced brain signal complexity, increased frontal connectivity and theta oscillations, and modulated the heartbeat-evoked potential (HEP). Classifiers using HEP features correctly identified the attentional state in 17 of 20 healthy participants; power spectral density features classified all 20. In five brain-injured patients, one with unresponsive wakefulness syndrome and one with locked-in syndrome showed willful modulation of the HEP, suggesting they could follow commands. These findings highlight how attention shapes sensory processing and may aid diagnosis in disorders of consciousness.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America
December 30, 2025
Esteban Munoz-Musat, Arthur Le Coz, Andrew W Corcoran et al.
5 citations
Mind blanking—a state of apparent mental emptiness—produces distinct brain signatures that separate it from mind wandering and focused attention. In 62 participants performing a sustained attention task, mind blanking was associated with behavioral lapses, reduced fast brain oscillations and complexity over posterior electrodes, and decreased long-range connectivity compared to both mind wandering and on-task states. Event-related potentials showed disrupted visual processing beginning 200 milliseconds after a stimulus, suggesting a breakdown in conscious access to sensory information. Brain activity patterns predicted mental states on individual trials, revealing dynamics that subjective reports alone miss. These findings indicate that being awake does not guarantee consciousness of something; mind blanking reflects genuine gaps in the stream of thought, arising from disruptions in generating or accessing thought content.
October 17, 2024
Thomas Andrillon, Antoine Lutz, Jennifer Windt et al.
4 citations
preprint
Mind blanking (MB) refers to moments during wakefulness when people report no specific thoughts. This review maps MB by examining its reportable expressions, brain signatures, and links to meditative practices and sleep (white dreams). The authors propose a mechanistic account linking MB to changes at physiological, neural, and cognitive levels. They argue that ongoing experience varies in richness and that seemingly contentless events are distinct mental states with their own diversity, challenging the view of the mind as primarily content-oriented.
bioRxiv Preprint Server
July 16, 2025
Borjan Milinkovic, Anil K. Seth, Lionel Barnett et al.
2 citations
preprint
Consciousness depends on neural activity across many scales. A new measure, dynamical independence (DI), quantifies these multi-scale relationships. Applying DI to EEG data from people under three anaesthetics, the authors found that propofol and xenon—which abolish conscious report—produce more emergent but highly variable dynamic structure, indicating fragmented macroscopic organisation. Ketamine, which preserves dream-like states, shows reduced overall emergence but partial preservation of macroscopic structure similar to wakefulness. Regional brain contributions varied. The results reveal drug-specific reconfigurations of emergent dynamics, dissociate the amount of emergence from its organisation, and caution against equating emergence with consciousness level.
bioRxiv : the preprint server for biology
November 8, 2025
Lucie Berkovitch, Alexandre Salvador, Thomas Andrillon et al.
preprint
Low doses of ketamine, an NMDA-receptor antagonist, disrupt the ability to consciously perceive visual information in healthy people. In a double-blind, placebo-controlled experiment with 21 volunteers, ketamine increased visual masking and reduced conscious perception of a digit. The N1 component of brain activity, an early marker of visual processing, was significantly reduced under ketamine and correlated with conscious access. Ketamine also induced psychotic-like and manic-like symptoms, but only the psychotic-like dimension was linked to impairments in conscious access. These findings suggest ketamine attenuates early visual brain responses, impairing conscious access, and that this mechanism differs in some ways from that seen in schizophrenia.
Neuroscience of consciousness
January 1, 2025
Jasmine Walter, Thomas Andrillon, Jennifer M Windt
Spontaneous thoughts and experiences (STE), such as mind wandering and dreaming, may occur in patients with disorders of consciousness (DoC). The evidence is indirect and inconclusive, but suggests STE could affect diagnosis, which currently focuses on detecting consciousness. Understanding these experiences might also illuminate subjective experience and quality of life in DoC, about which little is known. Because diagnostic decisions can have life-or-death consequences, it is important to use measures sensitive to internally directed conscious experiences. Further research is needed to explore STE in DoC and its implications for quality of life.
Cell reports
April 7, 2026
Nicolas Decat, Arthur Le Coz, Jade Sénéchal et al.
Mental experiences during wakefulness and sleep are not as distinct as commonly thought. Analyzing electroencephalography (EEG) from 92 participants during daytime rest, researchers collected 375 reports of mental content scored on bizarreness, fluidity, spontaneity, and wake perception. Clustering these reports revealed four distinct types of mental states. Crucially, all four types occurred across wakefulness, N1 sleep, and N2 sleep. EEG measures of spectral power, complexity, and connectivity differentiated these mental states independently of whether participants were awake or asleep. The findings indicate that the waking and sleeping brain can produce the same mental state, and that fine-grained brain dynamics shape the content of mental experiences.