School of Philosophy, Psychology and Language Sciences, Dugald Stewart Building, 3 Charles Street, Edinburgh, Midlothian EH8 9AD, UK. elizabethirv@gmail.com
2 papers in the library · 46 citations · publishing 2009-2020
Eliminativism about consciousness takes two forms: entity eliminativism, which denies that consciousness exists, and discourse eliminativism, which argues that talk of consciousness should be eliminated from science. The chapter examines classic arguments for entity eliminativism, including Dennett's position and recent illusionism, as well as discourse eliminativist arguments from scientific behaviorism and empirical accessibility. It concludes that these positions require serious defense and outlines the strategies used to support each form of eliminativism.
A critique argues that claims by Block and Snodgrass about phenomenal consciousness without access consciousness, based on signal detection theory analysis of qualitative difference paradigms like exclusion failure, are unwarranted. Partial cognitive access, not a total lack, can explain exclusion failure results. Snodgrass's Objective Threshold/Strategic model relies on a problematic 'enable' approach that denies intentional control of unconscious perception and effects of task instructions on phenomenal consciousness. Many of Block's examples also depend on this approach. Qualitative difference paradigms may index only a subset of access consciousness, so they cannot isolate phenomenal consciousness, and attempts to do so face serious methodological problems.