Revelation—the idea that introspection reveals the essential nature of conscious states—is often used to argue against physicalism. This paper highlights a neglected problem: introspection does not reveal conscious states as essentially causal, which pressures views toward epiphenomenalism. The author critiques Hedda Hassel Mørch’s 'phenomenal powers view' as an inadequate response and instead defends a version of the 'consciousness+' response, which accommodates the causal role of consciousness without requiring its essence to be revealed by introspection.
Russellian monism is a broad philosophical approach to explaining consciousness, with two main variants: panpsychism and panprotopsychism. Panpsychist Russellian monism claims that the fundamental properties of basic physical entities are experiential, meaning consciousness is a basic feature of matter. Panprotopsychist Russellian monism instead holds that these fundamental properties are proto-experiential—not conscious themselves, but essential for producing consciousness. The chapter first examines panpsychist forms, then turns to panprotopsychist forms.