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F. H. Bradley's Concept of Immediate Experience: An Evaluation in terms of Debates on Phenomenal Consciousness

Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) July 2, 2026 Betül Yıldız

F. H. Bradley, a British Idealist, argued that immediate experience is a primary, non-relational unity that precedes thought, judgment, and the subject-object distinction. However, any attempt to analyze or describe this experience in philosophical language objectifies it, destroying its pristine immediacy and creating a paradox of reflection. This paper contends that Bradley's methodological dilemma parallels contemporary debates on phenomenal consciousness, qualia, Thomas Nagel's 'what it is like to be' question, and non-conceptual content theories. Despite difficulties in Bradley's idealist metaphysics and the problem of ineffability, his approach remains a provocative resource for consciousness studies by challenging entrenched epistemic and cognitive assumptions.