The Categorical Failures of Higher-Order Theories (of Consciousness)
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) June 5, 2026 Arthur Stewart
Higher-order theories (HOT) of consciousness claim a mental state is conscious only when a second, higher-order state represents it. This paper argues HOT is not a genuine theory but a labeling scheme: it specifies a bare relation between two states, calls one 'conscious,' and supplies physical details and evidence only informally as needed. Because HOT refuses to commit to any specific physical implementation, it cannot legitimately use empirical findings as confirmation. The regress problem—the oldest objection—reveals structural failures: the theory provides no resources to block regress, license empirical citations, or distinguish conscious from non-conscious pairs. Defenders add ad hoc fixes (asymmetry stipulations, signal detection apparatus) that protect the bare biconditional, achieving unfalsifiability through variant-switching rather than absorbing anomalies.