The hard problem of consciousness—explaining why and how physical processes give rise to subjective experience—may be partly an artifact of assuming that consciousness and phenomenality (the quality of subjective experience) are inseparable. Rejecting this assumption and adopting a non-unitary view, in which consciousness and phenomenality can come apart, does not eliminate the hard problem but reframes it, making the explanatory task more tractable and reducing the apparent mystery. The paper sketches additional advantages of this non-unitary account.
A non-causal account of the relationship between consciousness and its neural correlates is preferable to a causal one, which implicitly involves an undesirable dualism of matter and mind. The identity theory, which holds that states of phenomenal consciousness are identical with their neural correlates, is favored. The paper argues that research into neural correlates of consciousness and the identity theory can enrich each other, but the identity theory requires a suitably defined concept of type, which has been neglected. A tentative hierarchical classification of phenomenal and neurophysiological types is proposed. The identity theory is compared with other mind-body conceptions, and scientists are urged to engage more with metaphysical issues.
Most consciousness theorists agree that a mental state cannot have a phenomenal character (what it feels like) without being conscious. This paper challenges that consensus by distinguishing two models. The unitary model treats the production of a phenomenal quality and its becoming conscious as a single process. The dual model, which the authors advocate, separates the formation of the phenomenal quality from the process that makes it conscious. They present conceptual, methodological, neuropsychological, and neural arguments that together support the dual model and the idea of unconscious mental qualities. The dual view is proposed as a hypothesis worth further investigation.