Monash Alfred Psychiatry Research Centre, Monash University Central Clinical School and The Alfred Hospital , Melbourne, VIC, Australia ; School of Psychological Sciences, Monash University , Melbourne, VIC, Australia.
2 papers in the library · 91 citations · publishing 2007-2014
A separate hard problem faces the scientific study of consciousness beyond the well-known 'hard problem' in philosophy of mind. This problem arises from the distinction between the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) and the neural constitution of consciousness. The correlation/constitution distinction poses a genuine challenge for a science of phenomenal consciousness. Several additional hard problems also confront the field. Scientists and philosophers should address these problems and consider the possibility that some may be intractable. Ultimate epistemic limits in studying phenomenal consciousness do not threaten physicalist or materialist ontologies but do inform our understanding of consciousness and its place in nature.
Consciousness science aims to find the neural basis of conscious experience, but a key problem is distinguishing neural correlates (brain activity that merely accompanies consciousness) from neural constitution (brain activity that actually generates consciousness). This paper reviews that distinction problem, arguing that current methods like recording, inhibition, and stimulation cannot reliably separate the two. The Jenga analogy illustrates why identifying minimal neural correlates is an insufficient goal. Even combined inhibition and stimulation strategies may reveal some constitutive activities but not the whole neural constitution. The author proposes new foundational claims for the field to address this challenge.