Breakdowns of sensemaking: a neurophenomenological approach
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences May 2, 2026 Justin Aaron Moll
When people lose their ability to make sense of the world, they experience phenomena ranging from extreme crises or epiphanies to everyday learning, frustration, or indifference. This paper integrates phenomenological philosophy (especially post-Heideggerian traditions) with neurocognitive and neurophysiological research on predictive processing and enactivism to create a unified model of such breakdowns. The resulting model describes a U-shaped distribution: extreme breakdowns challenge fundamental dimensions of sensemaking and become either crises or epiphanies, while less fundamental disruptions produce a continuum of learning, indifference, and frustration. The concept of response—how one reacts to a disruptive event—determines whether the experience enriches or problematizes sensemaking.