Frontiers in psychology
January 1, 2018
Wanja Wiese
29 citations
A meta-theoretical analysis examines the method of interdisciplinary constraint satisfaction (MICS) introduced in Metzinger's Being No One, which combines phenomenological, representationalist, and neurobiological perspectives to study consciousness. Despite this approach's promise, a mature science of consciousness remains elusive more than a decade later. The paper identifies hurdles MICS has yet to overcome, evaluates how existing approaches address these gaps, and argues that a unifying theory integrating different features of consciousness is necessary for progress.
Consciousness and Cognition
August 13, 2025
Azenet Lopez, Wanja Wiese
Consciousness science has many competing theories that often conflict, making progress toward a mature theory difficult. A building-block approach offers a way forward by focusing on simpler elements that make up theories, such as key notions or assumptions, rather than committing to entire theoretical proposals. This approach can help assess, integrate, and unify diverse theories. Two potential building blocks discussed are attention and information generation, given their roles in leading theories. The paper argues that shifting focus to these foundational constructs facilitates addressing urgent questions about consciousness in both natural and artificial systems.
Communications psychology
November 26, 2025
Morten Overgaard, Peter Fazekas, Asger Kirkeby-Hinrup et al.
The field of consciousness research lacks consensus due to reliance on competing grand theories. A more productive path forward would shift focus toward construct-based, data-driven, and iterative approaches that identify empirical building blocks of conscious experience, enabling cumulative and integrative progress.
Wanja Wiese, Karl Friston
preprint
The free energy principle reframes the search for neural correlates of consciousness by shifting focus from neural states to neural dynamics, and by adding computational correlates defined as probabilities encoded by neural states. This approach addresses two problems: explaining consciousness without sensory input or behavior, and distinguishing systems that genuinely are conscious from those that merely simulate consciousness. The principle-derived constraints help ascribe consciousness in controversial cases, such as during sensory deprivation, and clarify what it means to be a conscious system versus simulating one.