Embodied cognition (EC) has offered artificial intelligence an alternative to traditional computationalism, splitting into weak and strong versions. The weak version borders on functionalism, while the strong version claims body–world interactions constitute cognition. However, the notion of constitution is ontologically problematic and offers no clear empirical or technical benefits. This paper examines ontological issues in both approaches—circularity, epiphenomenalism, mentalism, and disguised dualism—and proposes a more radical alternative called mind-object identity, briefly compared with sensorimotor direct realism and embodied identity theory.
Artificial consciousness remains a nascent field. This paper outlines theoretical assumptions that could help address phenomenal consciousness—the subjective, first-person experience of being. It identifies technological and theoretical obstacles facing researchers and argues that artificial consciousness must confront how phenomenal consciousness arises in a physical world. The authors suggest that externalist models, which locate mental content partly outside the brain, currently offer the most promising path forward.
Consciousness can be located and bounded using a strictly physicalist approach. The paper identifies two unresolved issues in the extended cognition debate: the ontological status of cognition and the fallacy of the center. It proposes using identity to isolate the physical basis of consciousness, introducing Mind-Object Identity (MOI) as a tentative solution and comparing it with other identity theories of mind.