A sense-datum theory of perception is developed and defended. Perceptual experiences involve acquaintance with sense-data, which are private particulars that have all the properties they appear to have, are common to perception and hallucination, constitute phenomenal character, and are analogous to internal pictures. The theory diverges from classic versions in three ways: sense-data are neural states presented first-personally; their sensational qualities differ from the sensible qualities of external objects; and sense-data are the vehicles of perception, not the objects perceived. This package is argued to be a viable contemporary position in philosophy of perception.
Conscious experiences have many structural features, such as color experiences varying in hue, saturation, and brightness, decreasing visual acuity from the center to the periphery of the visual field, pain experiences in different magnitudes, and temporal experience flowing as a continuous stream. Structuralism, broadly defined, is an approach to consciousness research focused on investigating these structures. Varieties include methodological structuralism, which holds that scientific methods yield knowledge only of structural features, and ontic structuralism, which claims consciousness is nothing but structure. This special volume collects articles on the structures of conscious experiences and their role in research, aiming to establish a foundation and agenda for a structuralist research program in the science of consciousness.