From transcendental egology to orientation theory: Toward a mereological foundation for the different senses of the "self" in conscious experience.
Frontiers in psychology January 1, 2022 Joan González Guardiola
The authors argue that Husserl's phenomenology contains a notion of a 'minimal self' that is not reducible to a Cartesian subject. They distinguish the philosophy of the subject from the philosophy of the self, showing that Husserl's conception of the self does not align with the Cartesian association Heidegger criticized. By analyzing the 'senses of the self' in Husserl's work, they extract the concept of 'minimal self' relevant to current debates between psychiatry and phenomenology. The authors also demonstrate that moving from the transcendental ego to a theory of the orientation of conscious life requires grounding the concept of ego in the formal mereology of Husserl's third 'Logical Investigation.'