Scholarly discourse on meditation suffers from inconsistent terminology and a lack of agreed-upon definitions and categories. Past attempts to create new lexicons have been useful but remain debated and misinterpreted. This paper proposes two new models to improve scientific reliability. First, it suggests a taxonomic system based on the established third-person paradigm of Affect and Cognition, borrowed from psychology and cognitive science, rather than inventing new first-person terminology. Second, it offers a definitional model that distinguishes meditation method from meditative state, conceptualizing meditation as a dynamic process with six related stages. The goal is to provide researchers with a reliable nomenclature for categorizing meditation methods and a conceptual framework to guide research and theory.
The author argues that progress in consciousness research is hindered by imprecise language, conflated terminology, and a lack of operational definitions. A review of historical and current definitions reveals a plethora of overlapping concepts. The paper critiques the search for neural correlates of consciousness, calling for greater semantic clarity. It discusses whether consciousness should be understood as a process rather than a tangible thing located within the nervous system. Suggestions for improving discourse include adhering more strictly to operational definitions and reconsidering the conceptual foundations of the field.