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Friedrich Edelhäuser

4 papers in the library · 14 citations · publishing 2021-2026

Papers

Training naive subjects in using micro-phenomenological self-inquiry to investigate pain and suffering during headaches.

Scandinavian journal of psychology February 1, 2023 Terje Sparby, Mira Leass, Ulrich W Weger et al. 8 citations

Training people to use micro-phenomenological self-inquiry can improve their ability to describe the fine details of headache experiences, including distinguishing the sensation of pain from the experience of suffering. Thirteen untrained subjects met twice in one week to investigate their headache experiences using this method. Their reports became richer, as shown by more categories described and more words needed for accurate description. The method allows deep focus on single moments of experience but may miss broader contextual meanings. The authors suggest the approach could be useful in clinical settings with initially untrained subjects for describing specific experiences and answering complex phenomenological questions.

First-person access to decision-making using micro-phenomenological self-inquiry.

Scandinavian journal of psychology December 1, 2021 Terje Sparby, Anna-Lena Lumma, Friedrich Edelhäuser et al. 5 citations

Micro-phenomenology is a technique for improving first-person reports of experience, typically conducted with a second-person interviewer. A self-inquiry format, using a guiding document without an interviewer, offers time and cost advantages but its reliability for untrained subjects was unknown. This study attempted to replicate a previous experiment that tested whether micro-phenomenology increases report reliability. The replication failed. Possible explanations include a methodological weakness in the original study, ineffectiveness of the self-inquiry format used here, or that micro-phenomenological self-inquiry requires training. The authors conclude that the self-inquiry format is insufficient for conducting micro-phenomenological studies and that training is necessary.

The phenomenology of attentional control: a first-person approach to contemplative science and the issue of free will

Frontiers in Psychology March 12, 2024 Terje Sparby, Dirk Cysarz, David Hornemann V. Laer et al. 1 citation

Attentional control has two basic aspects: directing attention to different objects is experienced as easy and a sign of freedom, while sustaining attention on a chosen object is difficult because mind-wandering is inevitable. This raises the question of whether we are fundamentally unfree. An introspective study with six people performing various attention tasks over a month examined whether it is possible to experience the source of attention—the subject enacting freedom through attention. Common and contrasting experiences are reported, forming a basis for discussing the method of introspection and how to handle conflicting reports.

Steiner's trinitarian view and the philosophy of mind: A critique of Kuhn's landscape of consciousness taxonomy.

Acta psychologica July 1, 2026 Terje Sparby, Torbjørn Eftestøl, Markus Lindholm et al.

A recent taxonomy of philosophies of mind classifies Rudolf Steiner's view as mind-body dualism, but this classification is incorrect. Steiner's view is trinitarian, representing a unification of monism and dualism. This trinitarian conception challenges the taxonomy's placement of Steiner and suggests a potential fundamental limitation of the whole taxonomy, as monism and dualism may not be exclusive. Other thinkers such as Whitehead and de Chardin may also be trinitarian, indicating the taxonomy needs revision. The dualism versus monism debate mirrors limitations in current thinking. The trinitarian view offers a different approach to the hard problem of consciousness, understanding mind-body differentiation as part of human development.