Phenomenology makes unique contributions to scientific practice—concept formation, experimental design, and data collection—but when it comes to explanation, it faces a dilemma. Either phenomenological attempts to explain conscious phenomena fail to satisfy a central constraint on explanations (the asymmetry between explanans and explanandum), or they satisfy this asymmetry only by merging with non-phenomenological explanation types. The consequence is that insofar as phenomenological approaches are explanatory, they do not provide an own type of explanation. Three case studies of phenomenologically inspired experiments in cognitive science illustrate each contribution to experimental practice while also showing how the explanatory dilemma arises.
A core challenge to 4E (embodied, embedded, extended, enactive) cognition research is the “motley crew argument,” which claims that including neural, bodily, and environmental factors as parts of cognitive processes makes such phenomena too variable and flexible to study scientifically. This paper counters that argument by presenting four established methodological approaches that can handle this complexity. These methods provide a practical way to empirically investigate situated cognitive phenomena, connecting philosophical theory with empirical testing and thereby defending the scientific credibility of 4E research.