The relationship between phenomenal consciousness and cognitive access remains a fundamental but empirically elusive issue. Despite numerous attempts using partial-report, metacognitive, and no-report paradigms, as well as proposals to treat phenomenal consciousness as a natural kind, the methodological puzzle persists. The paper argues that none of these approaches have resolved the core difficulty, and that researchers must adopt an attitude of humility toward the study of phenomenal consciousness for now.
In inattentional blindness, people fail to report visible stimuli when their attention is elsewhere, famously missing a gorilla. However, the standard measure—asking if they noticed anything unusual—may be biased. In the largest set of inattentional blindness studies to date, participants who denied noticing a stimulus could still report its location, color, and shape, showing that perceptual information remains accessible. Introducing absent trials revealed that observers are biased to report not noticing, essentially playing it safe. These findings provide the strongest evidence yet of significant residual visual sensitivity in inattentional blindness and challenge the claim that awareness requires attention.