Experiential Presence and the Problem of Selfhood: A Candidate Invariant of Consciousness?
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) May 31, 2026 John Cantellow
Conscious experience may have a more fundamental and persistent feature than the forms of selfhood usually associated with it. Drawing on reports from dreaming, contemplative practice, psychedelic states, and nondual awareness, the paper introduces the concept of experiential presence: the minimal fact that experience appears present at all. This is a heuristic construct, not a metaphysical entity. Autobiographical identity, agency, embodiment, and self-boundary can transform while conscious experience remains. The paper considers competing interpretations and raises methodological and epistemological issues about whether experiential presence may be part of the condition under which consciousness becomes available for investigation. It does not claim experiential presence is universal, but aims to clarify questions for future research.