Access is mainly a second-order process: SDT models whether phenomenally (first-order) conscious states are accessed by reflectively (second-order) conscious processes.
Consciousness and cognition June 1, 2009 Michael Snodgrass, Natasha Kalaida, E Samuel Winer 28 citations
Conscious access can be divided into two types: first-order access, where content becomes phenomenally conscious, and second-order access, where that conscious content is selected for higher-order reflective processing. When second-order access is understood as optional and flexible, there are strong reasons to believe that stimuli can be phenomenally conscious without being accessed in this second-order way. The partial access argument against this view fails because exclusion failure is due to lack of second-order access, not insufficient conscious information. The enable account better fits qualitative differences and subjective report and is simpler than the alternative. Second-order access arguably reflects the core meaning of access generally.