The Forgotten Phenomenology: “Enactive Perception” in the Eyes of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy December 2, 2022 Roi Bar 2 citations
The enactive approach to perception, advanced by Alva Noë and Evan Thompson, claims that perception arises from interactions among brain, body, and environment, emphasizing self-motion and sensorimotor knowledge. Its proponents see it as consistent with, even a revival of, phenomenology. This paper argues that the enactive approach remains naturalistic and does not fully align with Husserl's transcendental method, which addresses intersubjectivity and the constitution of the cultural world. While there is common ground with Merleau-Ponty, major differences remain. The enactive approach deals only with necessary physiological conditions for animal perception, not sufficient sociocultural conditions for understanding human perception, such as historical and linguistic contexts. The perception of neurophenomenology as a revival reflects enactivism's scientific ethos and a neglect of philosophical phenomenology's objectives.