Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy
June 15, 2020
Geoffrey Dierckxsens
10 citations
Enactivism defines cognition through a subject's natural interactions with the physical environment and, recently, through participatory sensemaking, where ethical know-how emerges from participation and communication. This paper argues that participatory sensemaking, while valuable, downplays the significance of otherness for ethics, as Levinas' work shows that we cannot fully anticipate others through participation or know-how; caring for a terminally ill person always falls short. However, enactivism and Levinas' philosophy share a concept of subjectivity as interacting with the external world to gain knowledge. Enactivism's participatory sensemaking also offers a concept of social justice based on equality and participation, which Levinas insufficiently defines.
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy
December 2, 2022
Hayden Kee
6 citations
Merleau-Ponty and contemporary enactivists disagree about whether phenomenological descriptions apply to all organisms or only to sentient animals with sensorimotor systems. Merleau-Ponty limited phenomenology to sentient animals, while some enactivists extend it to all organisms, causing confusion about phenomenology's role. Merleau-Ponty also stressed a sharper divide between animal life and the human order than many enactivists do. Recent developmental and comparative psychology partly support his view, but he overstates the difference between human and animal cognition. A modified Merleau-Pontian account, tracing how children enter the human order in early life, better balances continuity and discontinuity.
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy
December 2, 2022
Roi Bar
2 citations
The enactive approach to perception, advanced by Alva Noë and Evan Thompson, claims that perception arises from interactions among brain, body, and environment, emphasizing self-motion and sensorimotor knowledge. Its proponents see it as consistent with, even a revival of, phenomenology. This paper argues that the enactive approach remains naturalistic and does not fully align with Husserl's transcendental method, which addresses intersubjectivity and the constitution of the cultural world. While there is common ground with Merleau-Ponty, major differences remain. The enactive approach deals only with necessary physiological conditions for animal perception, not sufficient sociocultural conditions for understanding human perception, such as historical and linguistic contexts. The perception of neurophenomenology as a revival reflects enactivism's scientific ethos and a neglect of philosophical phenomenology's objectives.
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy
April 12, 2024
Douglas Low
This paper challenges Jacques Derrida's criticisms of Maurice Merleau-Ponty's interpretation of Edmund Husserl. It argues that Derrida was wrong to claim that Merleau-Ponty misinterpreted Husserl's letter to Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, and that Derrida's critique of Husserl's phenomenology does not apply equally to Merleau-Ponty's work. Using careful textual evidence, the author shows that Merleau-Ponty's late lectures on language develop a phenomenology that integrates perception and language while still prioritizing perception over eidetic essences or linguistic expression.