The Surplus of Signification: Merleau-Ponty and Enactivism on the Continuity of Life, Mind, and Culture
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy December 2, 2022 Peer reviewed DOI: 10.5195/jffp.2020.919 via DOAJ
Summary
Merleau-Ponty and enactivists disagree about whether phenomenological descriptions apply to all organisms or only to sentient animals with sensorimotor systems. The paper argues that Merleau-Ponty's restriction is correct, because applying phenomenological concepts to creatures without phenomenal consciousness has caused confusion and led some enactivists to abandon phenomenology. Merleau-Ponty also emphasizes a sharp distinction between animal life and human order, which recent developmental and comparative psychology partly supports but also partly undermines. The paper proposes a modified Merleau-Pontian account that reduces this starkness by describing how children enter the human order during early development.
Study at a glance
| Design | theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key finding | Merleau-Ponty's restriction of phenomenological descriptions to sentient animals with sensorimotor systems should be followed, but his sharp distinction between the vital order of animals and the human order is somewhat overstated and can be mitigated by a developmental-phenomenological account. |
Abstract
This paper provides a critical discussion of the views of Merleau-Ponty and contemporary enactivism concerning the phenomenological dimension of the continuity between life and mind. I argue that Merleau-Ponty’s views are at odds with those of enactivists. Merleau-Ponty only applied phenomenological descriptions to the life-worlds of sentient animals with sensorimotor systems, contrary to those enactivists who apply them to all organisms. I argue that we should follow Merleau-Ponty on this point, as the use of phenomenological concepts to describe the “experience” of creatures with no phenomenal consciousness has generated confusion about the role of phenomenology in enactivism and prompted some enactivists to ignore or turn away from phenomenology. Further, Merleau-Ponty also emphasizes the stark distinction between the vital order of animals and the human order to a greater degree than many phenomenologically inspired enactivists. I discuss his view in connection with recent research in developmental and comparative psychology. Despite the striking convergence of Merleau-Ponty’s visionary thought with the most recent findings, I argue that he somewhat overstates the difference between human experience and cognition, and that of our closest animal kin. I outline a developmental-phenomenological account of how the child enters the human order in the first years of life, thereby further mitigating the stark difference between orders. This results in a modified Merleau-Pontian version of the phenomenological dimension of life-mind continuity which I recommend to enactivism.