Frontiers in psychology
January 1, 2024
Naotsugu Tsuchiya, Peter Bruza, Makiko Yamada et al.
8 citations
A new hypothesis called Quantum-like Qualia (QQ) proposes that qualia—the qualities of conscious experience—are best described by the mathematical structure of quantum theory, rather than as points in a dimensional space. The standard view assumes qualia can be measured without changing them, but empirical findings show that internal attention can alter qualia during measurement. QQ treats qualia as observables, sensory inputs and internal attention as states, and measurement outcomes as probabilistic. This structure predicts that qualia can be indeterminate, which can be tested through order effects or violations of Bell inequalities. Confirmation would suggest that quantum mathematics offers novel insights into consciousness.
Neuroscience of consciousness
January 1, 2025
Anikó Kusztor, Nirmitee Mulay, Makiko Yamada et al.
People experiencing depersonalization or derealization often report that the world looks faded, foggy, or dream-like. Two online experiments tested whether these subjective reports reflect genuine changes in visual perception. Participants with varying levels of depersonalization/derealization symptoms rated how real naturalistic images looked (Experiment 1, 200 participants) or adjusted the contrast and saturation of images to match their everyday visual experience (Experiment 2, 125 participants). In both experiments, strong Bayesian evidence supported the null models: symptom severity did not affect realness ratings or vividness adjustments. The results suggest that the altered vividness experience in derealization does not stem from genuine perceptual changes but rather from metacognitive interpretation of those experiences.
Naotsugu Tsuchiya, Masafumi Oizumi, Makiko Yamada et al.
preprint
The mystery of consciousness—how subjective experience arises from physical and chemical brain processes—is one of modern science's greatest challenges. Approaches that define humans and animals solely by observable behavior cannot scientifically address the conscious experiences of patients with hallucinations or delusions, nor those of non-verbal patients, infants, or animals. Recently, researchers confronting consciousness directly have advanced empirical studies of the brain-consciousness relationship. This article reviews several promising frameworks for consciousness research and introduces the authors' own strategy: clarifying the structure of conscious experience, the structure of information generated by the brain, and the relationships between these structures. The mathematical tool of category theory is briefly introduced as a means to achieve this, along with future prospects.