The Limits of Reflective Inquiry, the Philosophy of Mind, and Kant (Reflections on a Book)
Voprosy filosofii July 10, 2026 Viktor D. Bakulov, Danil R. Melnikov
A reflection on the collective monograph "Kant and the Philosophy of Mind" examines how Kant's critical project informs current analytic philosophy of consciousness. It asks which features of experience can be conceptually articulated and scientifically explained, and which point to principled limits of investigation. The paper discusses views of leading analytic Kantians—P.F. Strawson, W. Sellars, J. McDowell, H. Putnam—focusing on debates about phenomenal consciousness. It also considers mysterianism and panpsychism, showing how the same epistemic gap between the physical and the phenomenal can yield opposing conclusions: that consciousness is unknowable or that mentality is fundamental. Kant's question "What can I know?" retains methodological significance, delineating a productive space that avoids metaphysical dogmatism and epistemic skepticism while emphasizing examination of underlying assumptions.