From function to freedom: enactivism between being and becoming
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences January 24, 2026 Marius Werz
Enactivism, a theory of mind and life, is undergoing a metaphysical shift as some theorists adopt the 'affirmationist' ontologies of Gilbert Simondon and Gilles Deleuze, which view becoming as a non-teleological process where identities emerge from pre-individual fields. The author argues that this turn is incompatible with enactivism's foundational commitment to self-organizing organismic totalities. Instead, the paper develops a metaphysical framework that preserves these commitments while rejecting functionalist assumptions. It aligns enactivism with Marxist dialectical materialism and reinterprets Hans Jonas's account of life, which grounds meaning and purpose in the dynamic structure of living form rather than instrumental functions, offering a renewed foundation for theorizing purposiveness, autonomy, and change.